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PRIORITIZING MULTIPLE USES ON 
PUBLIC LANDS AFTER BEAR LODGE 
Erik B. Bluemel*
Abstract: This Article analyzes the courts’ application of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence to Native American cultural activities on federal 
land. The author concludes that the courts’ use of existing First 
Amendment law has been strained, especially with respect to Native 
American cultural practices on federal land. The Article analyzes Bear 
Lodge Multiple Use Association v. Babbitt within this context to conclude 
that First Amendment jurisprudence may not be the most appropriate 
legal construct for determining whether to allow or protect Native 
American cultural activities on federal land. Instead, the Article suggests 
that Native American practices are often best considered cultural, 
rather than religious, and as such, a First Amendment analysis, which 
has not been particularly favorable to Native American interests, would 
not apply. Applying a cultural lens to Native American practices, the 
Article concludes that federal land managers act well within their 
prescribed authority when they protect such activities. 
Introduction 
 “Nature is a recurring motif in the rich cultural tapestry that 
comprises our national identity and heritage.”1 In an effort to build 
national cultural identity, the federal government converted many 
                                                                                                                      
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Barefoot Sanders, Northern District of Texas;  Member, 
Commission on Environmental Law, IUCN-World Conservation Union. Member, Task 
Force on Access and Beneªt-Sharing and Traditional Knowledge, United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP), 2003–04; Vice-Chair, Committee on Environmental Law, 
New York County Lawyers’ Association, 2003–04; Member, Standing Committee on Envi-
ronmental Law, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 2003–04; Editor-in-Chief, 
New York University Environmental Law Journal, fall 2003; J.D., New York University School of 
Law, 2004. This Article, while derived from analysis and research conducted as part of an 
earlier report, Craig T. Donovan et al., N.Y. County Lawyers Ass’n, Comment on 
A04231 (2003), available at http://www.nycla.org/publications/nyclanew.pdf, reºects the 
views of the author only and does not necessarily reºect the views of any of the author’s 
institutional afªliates, their composite organs, or their staffs. 
This Article was selected as the winner of the second annual environmental justice es-
say competition, sponsored by the Environmental Justice Committee of the American Bar 
Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities. 
1 Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope: Cultural Resources on Public Lands, 73 
U. Colo. L. Rev. 413, 414 (2002). 
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Native American lands into parks and monuments;2 the appeal to na-
tional pride in public lands was crucial to establishing Yosemite as a 
preserve.3 Congress noted that 
the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should 
be preserved as a living part of our community life and de-
velopment . . . . [T]he preservation of this irreplaceable 
heritage is in the public interest so that its vital legacy of cul-
tural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and 
energy beneªts will be maintained and enriched for future 
generations of Americans.4
 Remarkable natural features have been described as American 
antiquities and protected as landmarks of historic interest, or symbols 
of American culture.5 Devils Tower National Monument, home to 
Devils Tower, known as Mato Tipi or Bear Lodge to the Tsitsi peo-
ples,6 was the ªrst parcel designated as a National Monument under 
the Antiquities Act of 1906 and was gloriªed as “such an extraordi-
nary example of the effect of erosion in the higher mountains as to 
be a natural wonder and an object of historic and great scientiªc in-
                                                                                                                      
2 See generally Nat’l Park Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Rethinking the National Parks for 
the 21st Century (2001), at http://www.nps.gov/policy/report.htm (last updated Dec. 24, 
2004); John Muir, Our National Parks (Sierra Club Books 1991) (1901); Sally Engle 
Merry, Law, Culture, and Cultural Appropriation, 10 Yale J.L. & Human. 575 (1998); Naomi 
Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 Yale J.L. & Human. 35 (2001). 
3 See 1 Aubrey L. Haines, The Yellowstone Story 158 (1977); Alfred Runte, Na-
tional Parks: The American Experience 18–22 (3d ed. 1997). Yosemite became a Na-
tional Park in 1890. Act of Sept. 25, 1890, ch. 1263, 26 Stat. 650 (1890). 
4 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(2), (4) (2000). 
5 See generally Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431–433 (2000); see also Peter Manus, 
One Hundred Years of Green: A Legal Perspective on Three Twentieth Century Nature Philosophers, 
59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 557, 598–601 (1998). 
6 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1449 n.1 (D. Wyo. 
1998), aff’d, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Lloyd Burton & David Ruppert, Bear’s 
Lodge or Devils Tower: Intercultural Relations, Legal Pluralism, and the Management of Sacred Sites 
on Public Lands, 8 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 201, 201 n.1, 206–08 (1999); Howard J. Vo-
gel, The Clash of Stories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative Approach to Cultural Conºict over Native 
American Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41 Santa Clara L. Rev. 757, 771 (2001). This Article 
will refer to Devils Tower National Monument as Bear Lodge National Monument, or sim-
ply as Bear Lodge, in recognition of the original name of the butte as Grizzly Bear 
Lodge—a name that was disregarded by Colonel Dodge, who renamed it Devils Tower. See 
Nat’l Park Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Final Climbing Management Plan/ 
Finding of No Signiªcant Impact (1995), available at http://www.nps.gov/deto/ 
deto_climbing/detotoc.html. The National Park Service is considering renaming the area 
to more accurately reºect its history, an action which this Article strongly endorses. Id. 
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terest.”7 Bear Lodge is of great importance not only to American cul-
ture, but to Native American culture as well.8
 Land, generally, is of great cultural signiªcance among many Na-
tive American tribes,9 some of whom, including the Lakota who in-
habit the Black Hills where Bear Lodge is located, refer to the land as 
“The Heart of Everything That Is.”10 It can be said of many tribes that 
“land is constitutive of cultural identity.”11 Often this relationship is 
forged through stories that are told depicting events occurring at par-
ticular sites—stories that help deªne tribes’ moral code of conduct.12 
Additionally, many public lands are considered sacred to Native 
American tribes. While some sites are labeled sacred sites, this label 
has not been attached to all lands of cultural or spiritual signiªcance 
to Native American tribes.13 The quality of being sacred can arise 
from human activity,14 or it can inhere in the natural condition of the 
site.15 As this Article discusses, sacred sites are not necessarily religious 
sites for First Amendment purposes, but they are sites of great cultural 
importance. Revitalization and protection of ceremonial rites and cul-
                                                                                                                      
7 Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (Sept. 24, 1906); see 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000). 
8 See infra Part II; see also Joel Brady, Comment, “Land Is Itself a Sacred, Living Being”: Na-
tive American Sacred Site Protection on Federal Public Lands Amidst the Shadows of Bear Lodge, 24 
Am. Indian L. Rev. 153, 165 (2000). 
9 See, e.g., Winona LaDuke, Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Environmental Futures, 5 
Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 127, 145–46 (1994); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Large Binocu-
lar Telescopes, Red Squirrel Piñatas, and Apache Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental 
Law in a Multicultural World, 96 W. Va. L. Rev. 1133, 1153 (1994). 
10 Alexandra New Holy, The Heart of Everything That Is: Paha Sapa, Treaties, and Lakota 
Identity, 23 Okla. City. U. L. Rev. 317, 317 (1998); see Allison M. Dussias, Science, Sover-
eignty, and the Sacred Text: Paleontological Resources and Native American Rights, 55 Md. L. Rev. 
84, 100–01 (1996); William Greider, The Heart of Everything That Is, Rolling Stone, May 7, 
1987, at 37. 
11 Rebecca Tsosie, Land, Culture, and Community: Reºections on Native Sovereignty and 
Property in America, 34 Ind. L. Rev. 1291, 1302 (2001). 
12 Id. at 1302–03; see also Keith H. Basso, Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and 
Language Among the Western Apache 38 (1996); Leslie Marmon Silko, The Indian 
with a Camera, in A Circle of Nations 7 ( John Gattuso ed., 1993). 
13 See Andrew Guilford, Sacred Objects and Sacred Places: Preserving Tribal 
Traditions 67–97 (2000); Thomas F. King, “Sacred Sites” Protection: Be Careful What You Ask for 
(May 28, 2002), at http://www.sacredland.org/resources/bibliography/thomas_king.html 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2005). Nor are those sacred sites considered equal in terms of cultural 
importance, as there are many different types of sacred sites. See Native American Sacred 
Sites and the Department of Defense ch. 3 (Vine Deloria, Jr. & Richard W. Stofºe eds., 
1998), https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/ES-Programs/Conservation/Legacy/Sa-
cred/ch3.html#ch3. 
14 Richard B. Collins, Sacred Sites and Religious Freedom on Government Land, 5 U. Pa. J. 
Const. L. 241, 241 (2003). 
15 Id.; see Vine Deloria, Jr., Sacred Lands and Religious Freedom, in For This Land: Writ-
ings on Religion in America 203, 207–11 ( James Treat ed., 1999). 
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tural practices is an important means of combating tribal social prob-
lems resulting from disassociation with tribes.16 In fact, it has been 
noted that “a perception of the land [is] essential to the identity of 
the [Native American] people.”17
 Native American cultural use of sacred sites is different in nature 
from the religious use of, for instance, Christian organizations which 
have often been granted access to public lands.18 As a result, “Ameri-
can Indian cultural interests in the public lands deserve special con-
sideration, given their unique associations with the land and its re-
sources, and the political and legal obligations arising from the 
historic treatment of tribes, their treaties, and their continuing sover-
eign status.”19 Nevertheless, current First Amendment jurisprudence 
treats site-speciªc Native American cultural needs in the same manner 
as it treats orthodox Christian religious activities, the vast majority of 
which can be practiced anywhere. 
 Today, the federal government owns over 600 million acres of 
land,20 with federal land management agencies responsible for regu-
lating activity on over 730 million acres.21 This vast amount of land 
now under the control of the federal government must be managed 
to reconcile various competing public and private uses. This is not an 
easy task, and it is continually becoming more complicated as more 
uses are being explored and developed. Unfortunately, often Native 
American and other uses are viewed as completely incompatible.22 
While this may be the case in certain exceptional circumstances, this 
Article seeks to disprove the general notion of competitive exclusion 
by unraveling the misunderstandings of current Native American 
practices and to avoid over-reliance on First Amendment jurispru-
dence, which tends toward exclusionary results. 
                                                                                                                      
16 See Stephen Cornell, The Return of the Native: American Indian Political 
Resurgence 110–11 (1988); Brady, supra note 8, at 166–67. 
17 Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of 
Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 Vt. L. Rev. 225, 276 (1996). 
18 See generally To Live over the Store: Essays on the Experience of a Christian 
Ministry in the National Parks (William L. Baumgaertner ed., 1992). 
19 Zellmer, supra note 1, at 414. 
20 Robert L. Glicksman & George Cameron Coggins, Modern Public Land Law 1 
(2d ed. 2001). 
21 See Ann M. Hooker, American Indian Sacred Sites on Federal Public Lands: Resolving 
Conºicts Between Religious Use and Multiple Use at El Malpais National Monument, 19 Am. In-
dian L. Rev. 133, 136 (1994). 
22 See Charlton H. Bonham, Devils Tower, Rainbow Bridge, and the Uphill Battle Facing Na-
tive American Religion on Public Lands, 20 Law & Ineq. 157, 194–97 (2002) (discussing the 
application of the theory of competitive exclusion to Native American land disputes). 
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 While other competing uses exist, the greatest threat to Native 
American cultural interests on federal public lands currently comes 
from recreational uses, which have been increasing signiªcantly in both 
type and quantity in recent years.23 The National Park Service (NPS) 
has a history of promoting wide recreational use at the expense of 
other park resources,24 causing one author to state that “[m]anaging 
recreation on public lands is now a primary goal for federal land man-
agement agencies like the National Park Service.”25 Additionally, the 
Bush administration has put forth an initiative to promote public 
health through increased visitation and recreational use of national 
parks.26 This initiative has been adopted by NPS which now provides 
free access to national parks for a weekend and promotes increased 
recreational use of the parks.27 This promotion of national parks as rec-
reational getaways increases pressure on Native American cultural re-
sources on public lands. 
 This Article posits that attempts to resolve competing uses of fed-
eral public lands through the inappropriate application of First 
Amendment “protections” to Native American cultural activities can be 
detrimental to Native American interests and overly restrictive of non-
Native American uses. First Amendment jurisprudence dominates the 
discourse surrounding Native American resource protection, yet First 
Amendment jurisprudence is not particularly valuable to compel or 
encourage agency action to protect Native American resources and cul-
tural interests. Nevertheless, courts, scholars, and agencies have limited 
their analysis of Native American issues to religious considerations, 
foreclosing another possible route of protection of sacred sites and as-
sociated cultural activities: one based upon cultural protections. This 
Article seeks to dispel the myth that First Amendment protections are 
the most protective of Native American cultural interests and counsels 
for greater use of culture- and tribal relation-based protections. 
                                                                                                                      
23 See id. at 199. 
24 See America’s National Park System 53–55 (Larry M. Dilsaver ed., 1994). 
25 Bonham, supra note 22, at 194. 
26 President George W. Bush, HealthierUS: The President’s Health and Fitness 
Initiative ( June 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ªtness/ªtness-policy-book.pdf. 
27 Press Release, Nat’l Park Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, NPS Director Lauds Presi-
dent Bush’s Initiative to Promote Improved Health Through Visiting National Parks ( June 
18, 2002), http://data2.itc.nps.gov/release/Detail.cfm?ID=267. 
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I. First Amendment Jurisprudence of Cultural Claims 
 Freedom of religion is protected by two clauses in the First 
Amendment: the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. 
The Free Exercise Clause seeks to allow each individual the opportu-
nity to practice her religious beliefs, while the Establishment Clause 
seeks to prevent the coercion of an individual into a particular reli-
gious belief. 
 “The two religion clauses are not mutually exclusive, nor are they 
in perfect equipoise.”28 Some scholars argue, rather forcefully, that the 
gap between the requirement of accommodation in the Free Exercise 
Clause and the promotion of religion in the Establishment Clause al-
lows for the protection of Native American religious resources.29 This 
claim is sound, but is not entirely protective of Native American inter-
ests, as “[t]he religion clauses of the First Amendment—protecting free 
exercise while prohibiting governmental establishment of religion— 
have not afforded meaningful protection for cultural resources.”30 This 
is not unexpected, considering that Native American tribes must liti-
gate their interests in the “courts of the conqueror.”31 Nevertheless, 
“[w]hen a Native American sacred site is threatened by federal action, 
the Native American community has primarily reacted by claiming that 
such action equals a violation of their First Amendment right to the 
free exercise of religion.”32
                                                                                                                      
28 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669, 673 (1970) (“The limits of permissible state 
accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference man-
dated by the Free Exercise Clause.”); Zellmer, supra note 1, at 475. 
29 Zellmer, supra note 1, at 475–76; see also Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Hon-
oring the Establishment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 1291, 
1318 (1996) (“Until desecrating sacred sites is considered a sufªcient burden on religion 
to give rise to a free exercise of religion claim, preserving these sites in their natural state 
should not be considered a beneªt to religion under the Establishment Clause.”). 
30 Zellmer, supra note 1, at 415; see United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404, 407–08 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (providing several examples where courts have refused to disturb government 
land management decisions challenged by Native Americans on Free Exercise grounds). 
31 See Larry Sager, Rediscovering America: Recognizing the Sovereignty of Native American In-
dian Nations, 76 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 745, 750 (1999). 
32 David S. Johnston, Note, The Native American Plight: Protection and Preservation of Sa-
cred Sites, 8 Widener L. Symp. J. 443, 448 (2002); see Lydia T. Grimm, Sacred Lands and the 
Establishment Clause: Indian Religious Practices on Federal Lands, 12 Nat. Resources & Env’t 
19, 22 (1997). 
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A. Deªnition of Religious Activity 
 Deªning religion can be a challenge in any dispute about 
religious freedom. So long as the issue is addressed politi-
cally, it is simply one of the terms of political discourse. But 
when judicial review is sought under statutes or constitu-
tional provisions that protect religion but not culture or 
other ethical concerns or group interests, the distinction can 
become crucial to judicial resolution and can in turn raise 
difªcult questions about equal treatment. The issue has spe-
cial relevance to indigenous religions, which often have less 
distinct boundaries from culture than does Christianity.33
 Before beginning with a constitutional analysis of the First 
Amendment, caution must be given to the general applicability of the 
First Amendment. Most scholars discussing Native American cultural 
uses of federal public lands do so by reference to First Amendment 
jurisprudence without signiªcant analysis as to what triggers First 
Amendment protection. The application of the First Amendment 
generally requires that practitioners believe in a “Supreme Being”34 or 
“ultimate concern”35—a being with “sentience beyond the human 
and capable of acting outside of the observed principles and limits of 
natural science”—which “makes demands of some kind on its adher-
ents”36 and that practitioners believe that adherence to such demands 
are extra-temporal “in some meaningful way . . . either by affecting 
their own eternal existence or by producing a permanent and ever-
lasting signiªcance and place in reality.”37
                                                                                                                      
33 Collins, supra note 14, at 243. 
34 E.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965). 
35 Jesse H. Choper, Deªning “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 579, 
594–97; see also Note, Toward a Constitutional Deªnition of Religion, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1056, 
1056 (1978). 
36 Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief 17 (1993). 
37 Jesse H. Choper, Securing Religious Liberty 77 (1995); see Raymond Cross & 
Elizabeth Brenneman, Devils Tower at the Crossroads: The National Park Service and the Preser-
vation of Native American Cultural Resources in the 21st Century, 18 Pub. Land & Resources L. 
Rev. 5, 41 (1997) (noting that the district court’s ªnding in Bear Lodge that the Sun Dance 
is a religious activity fails the deªnition established by Choper). In fact, the Sun Dance is 
“fundamentally non-commemorative in character and non-salvation directed.” Cross & 
Brenneman, supra, at 41. 
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 Not all cultural uses are therefore religious uses.38 In fact, praying 
to a supreme being would not necessarily constitute a religious activity. 
Many Native American uses are not easily analogized to that of the “or-
thodox belief in God” and therefore may not be considered religious 
uses.39 This is particularly true where Native American beliefs and prac-
tices are attached to particular parcels of land.40 Additionally, many Na-
tive American practices are both cultural and religious in nature, which 
are difªcult to separate for First Amendment analysis purposes.41
 Some scholars have noted that the First Amendment was enacted 
before American society was aware of its heterogeneity of religious be-
liefs and before Native Americans were incorporated into the American 
citizenry.42 Attempting to anachronistically apply the First Amendment 
to Native American cultural activities does not come without a price. In 
fact, attempting to corral primarily cultural activities into religious ac-
tivities may have severely negative consequences for Native American 
interests, where cultural uses may receive greater protections and ac-
commodations than religious protections, as will be seen below. 
B. Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
 The Free Exercise Clause is designed to protect individuals from 
being so restricted by government regulation that the practice of their 
sincere religious beliefs is unconstitutionally burdened.43 Where a regu-
                                                                                                                      
38 See Vogel, supra note 6, at 774. 
 Cases involving efforts to exempt religiously grounded conduct from the 
reach of the law of the state as a matter of religious liberty protected by the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are typically framed as individual 
rights cases. Consequently, courts frequently neglect or give less than full con-
sideration to the deep cultural signiªcance of these cases to the communi-
ties . . . . 
Id. 
39 See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165–66. However, it has been implicitly argued that deªning 
Native American use of sacred sites as “cultural” opens the door to qualiªcation of the 
right to use the property by other competing interests. See Tsosie, supra note 11, at 1305. 
This Article argues that this claim, in fact, is not the case, or is no different than what the 
outcome would be if framed as a purely religious claim. 
40 See Zellmer, supra note 1, at 477; infra Part II.A. 
41 See Richard Pemberton, Jr., “I Saw That It Was Holy”: The Black Hills and the Concept of 
Sacred Land, 3 Law & Ineq. 287, 288–89 (1985); see also David H. Getches et al., Cases 
and Materials on Federal Indian Law 754–55 (4th ed. 1998). 
42 See Zellmer, supra note 1, at 490–91; see also Carter, supra note 36, at 133. 
43 See Deloria, supra note 15, at 203–13; Scott Hardt, Comment, The Sacred Public Lands: 
Improper Line Drawing in the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Analysis, 60 U. Colo. L. Rev. 601, 
621–22 (1989). 
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lation burdens a particular group directly as its purpose, it must with-
stand strict scrutiny, which requires a narrowly tailored approach to 
further a compelling government interest to overcome the discrimina-
tion.44 Where, however, the regulation is neutral with respect to relig-
ions, and burdens one religion incidentally, rational basis review applies 
and the government need only show that the regulation was rational.45 
However, if a regulation is facially neutral, but is intended to impact 
religious practices, it will be subject to a more stringent form of review 
than rational basis review.46 Similarly, strict scrutiny also is applied 
where exemptions from regulations are granted to qualifying non-
religious groups, but not to qualifying religious groups.47
 In the landmark case Employment Division v. Smith, the Court held 
that even where neutral legislative or regulatory restrictions destroy 
the central tenets of a religion, rational basis scrutiny should never-
theless be used to evaluate the law.48 This is because “courts must not 
presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion.”49 
The idea in Smith was that where a neutral regulation incidentally 
burdens a religious activity, the regulation need only be scrutinized 
using a rational basis standard. 
 After Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA).50 RFRA applies the strict scrutiny test requiring the least 
restrictive means to further a compelling government interest wherever 
“free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”51 The Act was ren-
                                                                                                                      
44 E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
45 See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707–08 (1986). If the regulation incidentally burdens 
not only religious beliefs and practices, but also other fundamental rights, strict scrutiny 
may be required. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990); Ala. & 
Coushatta Tribes v. Trs. of Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1332 (E.D. Tex. 
1993). This issue may be implicated by limiting the right to association as well as the right 
to religious practice. See Kevin J. Worthen, One Small Step for Courts, One Giant Leap for Group 
Rights: Accommodating the Associational Role of “Intimate” Government Entities, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 
595, 605–09 (1993). 
46 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537 
(1993). 
47 See id. 
48 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883, 886–87. The centrality test, however, has not been applied 
to Western religious tenets, and therefore, Native American religious activities must 
achieve a higher threshold of importance to receive protections than Western religions. See 
Brady, supra note 8, at 160; Johnston, supra note 32, at 448–49. 
49 Smith, 494 U.S. at 887. 
50 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 
(2000). The Act was speciªcally intended to negate the Smith decision. See Bonham, supra 
note 22, at 170, 170 n.99. 
51 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). 
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dered inapplicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment,52 
but nevertheless remains applicable to federal actions.53
 While no courts have analyzed Native American religious or cul-
tural claims related to the use of or access to federal public lands un-
der RFRA,54 the courts have historically found that government regu-
lation of Native American uses of or access to public lands for 
religious purposes did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.55 Addi-
tionally, according to Justice O’Connor in Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, locating Native American religion at a particu-
lar site “could easily require de facto beneªcial ownership of some 
rather spacious tracts of public property.”56 “The decision in Lyng ef-
fectively marked the end of Native American attempts to employ the 
Free Exercise Clause to protect Native American religious sites on 
public lands . . . .”57 Lyng, however, recognized that where vindication 
of a constitutional right affords no greater remedies than vindication 
of parallel statutory rights, judicial restraint should counsel against 
                                                                                                                      
52 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 536 (1997). 
53 E.g., O’Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003); Kikumura v. 
Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 2001); Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 
F.3d 826, 831 (9th Cir. 1999); Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 1999); In re 
Young, 141 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1998); Alamo v. Clay, 137 F.3d 1366, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). 
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 § 7, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000cc (2000), directly follows the substantive standards established under RFRA, but it 
applies those standards to states under the Spending and Commerce Clause power rather 
than through the remedial power of the Fourteenth Amendment, §§ 2000cc-1(b)(1), 
2000cc-1(b)(2). While it has been called into constitutional question, it has nevertheless 
survived most challenges thus far. See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 322 (4th Cir. 2003); 
Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 611 (7th Cir. 2003); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 
1062, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2002). But see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 260, 263–68 (6th 
Cir. 2003). 
54 Some cases, however, have raised Native American claims regarding the cultural use 
of eagles. See United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1118–20 (10th Cir. 2002). For other 
non-Native American cases recently heard, see Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 
2001), and Kimbrough v. Cal., 2 Fed. Appx. 893 (9th Cir. 2001). 
55 E.g., United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404, 407 (8th Cir. 1988); Lyng v. Northwest In-
dian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 441–42 (1988); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 
735, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856, 858–59 (8th Cir. 1983); Badoni v. 
Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 
1159, 1165 (6th Cir. 1980); Miccosukee Tribe v. United States, 980 F. Supp. 448, 464 (S.D. 
Fla. 1997); Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1486 (D. Ariz. 1990); In-
upiat Cmty. v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 189 (D. Alaska 1982), aff’d, 746 F.2d 570, 
571–72 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Brian Edward Brown, Religion, Law, and the Land: 
Native Americans and the Judicial Interpretation of Sacred Land 1–7 (1999); 
Zellmer, supra note 1, at 480. 
56 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453. 
57 Bonham, supra note 22, at 165. 
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deciding the constitutional issue.58 As a result, Lyng may mean that 
RFRA claims will preclude ever reaching the constitutional issues in 
religious cases. 
C. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
 On the other hand, the Constitution “afªrmatively mandates ac-
commodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions”59—accommoda-
tion is especially “crucial in the Native American context, where gov-
ernmental suppression of minority religious practices, not their 
accommodation, has been the rule.”60 The Establishment Clause seeks 
to ensure that government treats all religions equally, without favoritism. 
Therefore, where a “‘governmental action is sufªciently likely to be per-
ceived by adherents of the controlling denomination as an endorse-
ment, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual reli-
gious choices,’” the action may violate the Establishment Clause.61
 The well-known and long-applied test formulated in the Lemon v. 
Kurtzman case requires three things to avoid running afoul of the Estab-
lishment Clause: (1) the action must not be religious in purpose; (2) 
the action’s effect must primarily affect non-religious interests;62 and 
(3) the action must not excessively entangle the acting government en-
tity with religion.63 The issue in Establishment Clause cases when de-
termining a religious purpose is differentiating between the removal of 
burdens to practicing religions and the conferral of special beneªts on 
religious groups.64 This line may be difªcult to establish with any preci-
sion or clarity.65 Protecting Native American religious and cultural in-
terests in public lands through the removal of burdens on such inter-
                                                                                                                      
58 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 446. 
59 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). 
60 Cross & Brenneman, supra note 37, at 40. 
61 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand 
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985)). 
62 Under this prong is the requirement that the action not place an undue burden on 
non-beneªciaries of the action. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11–15, 18 (1989); 
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987). Although not clearly deªned, an undue burden generally exists 
when the burdens are grossly disproportionate to the beneªt to the religious beneªciaries. 
Bullock, 489 U.S. at 15, 19 n.8; see also Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709–
10 (1985). Determining undue burden and religious beneªt while refraining from any 
evaluation of the religious importance of the particular tenet affected seems impossible to 
achieve in practice. 
63 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
64 See Zellmer, supra note 1, at 499–503. 
65 See id. at 503. 
376 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 32:365 
ests is considered a secular purpose and is not considered to confer any 
special beneªts on Native American religious practitioners.66 There-
fore, the difference is crucial whether the legislation seeks to remove a 
burden from or confer a beneªt upon religious activity, especially since 
removing a substantial burden from the exercise of religion will likely 
be upheld regardless of the impact upon non-beneªciaries.67 Viewing 
federal ownership of Native American sacred sites as a burden upon 
Native American cultural or religious practice is one important step 
toward protecting those cultural uses of federal public lands. Regula-
tion which adversely affects non-religious entities under such circum-
stances actually serves to remove a burden established upon federal 
ownership and the designation of the lands as public and available to 
all citizens. 
 In determining what interests are primarily affected by a law or 
regulation, courts must look to the importance of the interests af-
fected as well as the type of interest affected. As a result, while Free 
Exercise jurisprudence rejects consideration of the importance of re-
ligious tenets to the religion,68 courts have been far more willing to 
consider such issues in Establishment Clause cases. Additionally, the 
second prong of the Establishment Clause requires that all similarly 
situated groups be treated similarly.69 However, where no other 
groups are similarly situated, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether Con-
gress has chosen a rational classiªcation to further a legitimate end,” 
not a strict scrutiny standard.70 Native American tribes, as unique and 
semi-autonomous political entities,71 are not similar to other religious 
groups.72 Equal protection considerations can therefore be avoided 
                                                                                                                      
66 See id. at 415. 
67 See, e.g., Bullock, 489 U.S. at 14–15; see also Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 
2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1454–55 (D. Wyo. 1998), aff’d, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999). 
68 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (“[C]ourts must not pre-
sume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion . . . .”). 
69 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000); Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 846 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Neutrality, in both form and effect, is one 
hallmark of the Establishment Clause.”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) 
(“The government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects.”). 
70 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338–39 (1987); see Zellmer, supra note 1, at 506–07. 
71 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 350, 380–81 (1832) (ªnding that Native 
Americans had not surrendered their right of self-government). 
72 See, e.g., Rupert v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 34–35 (1st Cir. 1992); Pe-
yote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1216–17 (5th Cir. 1991); Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). Mancari creates objectionable standards by which to 
determine Native American tribe membership (e.g., blood relations) that have since fallen 
into disfavor. See Winslow, supra note 29, at 1322. Membership in tribes is now more aptly 
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when establishing policies favoring Native American tribes due to 
their unique political status.73 Federal Native American law, in fact, is 
centered on this unique political status.74 This unique status is espe-
cially keen with respect to Native American cultural practices—and 
religious practices that are signiªcant to tribal culture—as there is a 
legitimate government interest in tribal culture, which allows the ap-
plication of preferential treatment to Native American practices with-
out violating the Establishment Clause.75
 Regarding the excessive entanglement prong, it has been widely 
recognized that “total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. 
Some relationship between government and religious organizations is 
inevitable.”76 Indeed, forcing such a separation would be “callous in-
difference” to religion and therefore inappropriate.77 One of the 
difªculties in Establishment Clause cases, then, is determining where 
the line is drawn between creating a sufªcient relationship so the re-
ligion can ºourish and excessively entangling government activities 
                                                                                                                      
determined by reference to political status. See id. However, the application of non-
religious doctrines is not without its own drawbacks, since regulation harming Native 
American tribes’ religious practices, if viewed through a non-religious lens, would not re-
quire strict scrutiny. See id. at 1323–24. 
73 See, e.g., Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977); Mancari, 417 U.S. 
at 551; see also Zellmer, supra note 1, at 416–17 (noting that equal protection concerns can 
be overcome with respect to both federally and non-federally recognized tribes, though 
the level of scrutiny applicable may vary depending upon the tribe’s particular political 
relationship with the United States). 
74 Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural 
Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 191, 192 
(2001). 
75 See, e.g., Rupert, 957 F.2d at 34–36 (ªnding a rational relationship to exist between al-
lowing federal tribes to use eagle feathers for religious purposes and the government’s 
interest in tribal culture). Collection of eaglets for religious purposes by the Hopi tribe is 
allowed, despite restrictions on such takings on other groups. See Protection of Bald and 
Golden Eagles, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668–668d (2000); Migratory Bird Treaty, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–711 
(2000). NPS did not allow such an exemption until 2001, when it promulgated regulations 
allowing such unique religious uses for the Hopi. Compare 36 C.F.R. § 2.2(a) (2001) with 
Religious Ceremonial Collection of Golden Eaglets From Wupatki National Monument, 66 
Fed. Reg. 6516, 6517 ( Jan. 22, 2001) (codiªed at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7). As would be expected, 
the proposed regulation conºicted with other interested parties who feared a snowball 
effect that might allow taking of other “wildlife such as bison, black bears, and birds of 
prey from inside parks . . . .” See Todd Wilkinson, Tribal Religion Clashes with Eagle Protections, 
Christian Sci. Monitor, July 5, 2000, at 1. For further discussion of the Wupatki dispute, 
see generally Brent Gunson, Cultural Tug of Wars: An Analysis of the Legal Issues Involving the 
NPS Proposed Rule to Allow Taking of Golden Eagles at Wupatki National Monument for Religious 
Purposes, 22 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 399 (2002). 
76 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602, 614 (1971). 
77 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952). 
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with religious groups. As a result, “the context of a particular case, 
including historic circumstances, special relationships, the coercive 
impact of the government action, and the location of the activity at 
issue is of critical importance.”78
 Additionally, a compelling government interest exists in main-
taining historical and cultural attachments to the land. Actions which 
enable Native American tribes to maintain such attachments will likely 
overcome the Establishment Clause hurdle, even if analyzed under a 
strict scrutiny standard. Where non-Native Americans are completely 
excluded from visiting a sacred site or where Native American reli-
gious practitioners solely control the use of the sacred site either di-
rectly or through veto power of otherwise lawful activities, however, 
the government may have excessively entangled itself with religion.79 
This is almost never the case, for agencies act as mere custodians of 
Native American cultural resources and to remove barriers to practic-
ing ceremonial rites created by federal ownership of the land.80
 Despite the opportunity to protect Native American religious uses 
on federal public lands, the Lemon test has proven a mixed bag when 
it comes to the protection of Native American religious resources on 
federal public lands.81 The foregoing discussion illustrates that each 
of the three prongs of the Lemon test has been misapplied with rela-
tion to Native American religious claims on federal public lands. 
 Recently, the Lemon test has fallen out of favor,82 with new tests to 
determine violations of the Establishment Clause, such as the en-
dorsement and coercion tests, emerging. The endorsement test looks 
at the groups beneªted by the government action, the nature of the 
action, and the relationship between the religion and government 
created by the action.83 Essentially, the endorsement test has col-
lapsed the three Lemon test requirements into a single test that evalu-
ates all three requirements together for their collective effect.84 It 
                                                                                                                      
78 Zellmer, supra note 1, at 497. 
79 See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 695–96 
(1994); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126–27 (1982); see also Badoni v. Hig-
ginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980) (dictum); Zellmer, supra note 1, at 416. 
80 Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1456 (D. Wyo. 1998), 
aff’d, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999). 
81 See generally John H. Garvey, Is There a Principle of Religious Liberty?, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 
1379 (1996). 
82 See William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal Pro-
tection and Free Speech Concerns, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 227, 237–38 & nn. 47–48 (1995); Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 795, 797 (1993). 
83 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
84 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000). 
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evaluates whether government action endorses a particular religious 
belief,85 “send[ing] a message to nonadherents that they are outsid-
ers, not full members of the political community, and an accompany-
ing message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of 
the political community.”86
 The coercion test seeks to identify whether government action 
coerces support for a religious belief.87 Key components to the coer-
cion test are the context and the characteristics of the affected popu-
lation. For example, applying the coercion test, the Court found no 
Establishment Clause violation where the Nebraska state legislature 
opened with a prayer, since the population was composed of adults 
“not readily susceptible to religious indoctrination” or pressure,88 but 
it did ªnd a violation where a public high school graduation was 
started with a prayer since graduation is an important event in life 
and students are more susceptible populations.89
 Although the endorsement and coercion tests seek to simplify the 
test used to determine establishment of religion, it is unclear how 
these tests will treat Native American religious claims. As a result, Na-
tive American activists seeking to protect religious activities on federal 
public lands might be wary of Establishment Clause cases until one 
test emerges dominant and its contours are better deªned. Although 
the impacts of the emerging tests are uncertain at this point, the 
afªrmative obligations imposed by the Establishment Clause do pro-
vide an important avenue by which Native American activists might 
compel agency action to accommodate their religious practices. How-
ever, the following analysis of the Bear Lodge case illustrates the 
difªculty in relying upon confusing and unsettled First Amendment 
jurisprudence as a means to protect Native American cultural inter-
ests. 
                                                                                                                      
85 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 712–21 (1994) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
86 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
87 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592–94 (1992); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 
U.S. 573, 660–61 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
88 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792, 794–95 (1983) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
89 Lee, 505 U.S. at 595. 
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II. Bear Lodge: A Case Stuck in the Past 
A. Background 
 Bear Lodge is where, according to Kiowa legend, seven Native 
American sisters, escaping the clutches of some hungry bears, jumped 
onto a small rock.90 The girls, trapped by the bears, prayed to the rock 
for aid.91 The rock answered their prayers by growing to the sky, where 
the girls became the stars of the Big Dipper.92 The distinctive columns 
and lines of the site are attributed to the bears, which clawed at the girls 
as the rock grew.93 Numerous Native American cultural ceremonial 
practices are performed in and around Bear Lodge and many tribal 
stories and moral lessons are taught by reference to the site.94
 As a result, Bear Lodge is protected for its value as a sacred site to 
northern plains tribes.95 It is located in the Black Hills, an area of 
high spiritual importance to those tribes.96 The Black Hills were re-
                                                                                                                      
90 Nat’l Park Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Devils Tower: First Stories, at http://www. 
nps.gov/deto/stories.htm (last updated Dec. 22, 2004); see also Bonham, supra note 22, at 
175; Brady, supra note 8, at 165; Burton & Ruppert, supra note 6, at 201. Of course, the 
Kiowa legend is not the only tribal legend associated with the site. See Nat’l Park Serv., 
supra, for other legendary stories associated with Bear Lodge. 
91 Bonham, supra note 22, at 175; Brady, supra note 8, at 165; Burton & Ruppert, supra 
note 6, at 201. 
92 Bonham, supra note 22, at 175; Brady, supra note 8, at 165; Burton & Ruppert, supra 
note 6, at 201. 
93 Bonham, supra note 22, at 175; Brady, supra note 8, at 165; Burton & Ruppert, supra 
note 6, at 201. 
94 See Bonham, supra note 22, at 175–76. 
95 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1449 n.1 (D. Wyo. 
1998), aff’d, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 6, at 62 
(indicating that Bear Lodge is eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic 
Places but that “NPS protects a site that is eligible for the National Register in the same way 
as if it were actually listed.”); Nat’l Park Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Final Gen-
eral Management Plan/Environmental Impact Statement: Devils Tower National 
Monument 66 (2001) [hereinafter Nat’l Park Serv., GMP], http://www.nps.gov/deto/ 
gmp_ªnal/pdf/ªnal_gmp.pdf (recommending the Sun Dance grounds for listing on the 
National Register of Historic Places to better protect the grounds and allow for continued 
ceremonial practices); Burton & Ruppert, supra note 6, at 206–08 (discussing its value as a 
sacred site); George L. San Miguel, Nat’l Park Serv., How Is Devils Tower a Sacred Site to 
American Indians? (1994), at http://www.nps.gov/deto/place.htm (last updated Dec. 22, 
2004). 
96 See John G. Neihardt, Black Elk Speaks: Being the Life Story of a Holy Man 
of the Oglala Sioux 230 (1932); Derek de Bakker, Note, The Court of Last Resort: Ameri-
can Indians in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 11 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 939, 
963–64 (2004); see also Pemberton, supra note 41, at 288. See generally John P. La Velle, Res-
cuing Paha Sapa: Achieving Environmental Justice by Restoring the Great Grasslands and Returning 
the Sacred Black Hills to the Great Sioux Nation, 5 Great Plains Nat. Resources J. 40 (2001); 
 
2005] Prioritizing Multiple Uses on Public Lands 381 
served in the Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1868,97 but that treaty was ab-
rogated by Congress upon the discovery of gold in 1877.98 Not too 
long after the abrogation of the treaty, the Sun Dance, a traditional 
Sioux ceremony performed at the top of Bear Lodge, was made pun-
ishable by withholding rations for up to ten days for a ªrst offense; for 
subsequent offenses rations were withheld for ªfteen to thirty days or 
violators were imprisoned for up to thirty days.99
 Bear Lodge is a site important to the ceremonial Sun Dances and 
is a place where religious leaders go on Vision Quests, quests that in-
volve individual searches for spiritual guidance in their daily lives.100 
The Sun Dance is performed by a few leaders, and Vision Quests are 
conducted by individuals; both cultural uses require peace, quiet, and 
serenity.101 These cultural uses are of vital importance to tribes that 
practice the Sun Dance and Vision Quests, including the Cheyenne 
River Sioux tribe: “[B]y going there, we are nurturing ourselves and 
preserving our culture . . . . Our traditional, cultural and spiritual use 
of Mato Tipila is vital to the health of our nation and to our self-
determination as a Tribe.”102 Without question, Bear Lodge is of im-
portance both to the historical and contemporary spiritual values of 
numerous plains Native American tribes.103
B. Management Plan 
 Recognizing the importance of Bear Lodge to plains tribes’ cul-
tures, NPS decided to regulate use of the rock tower to protect tribal 
                                                                                                                      
Wilmer Stampede Mesteth, Panel VII: Environmental Justice & the Sacred Black Hills: Healing 
the Wounds of History, 7 Great Plains Nat. Resources J. 86 (2002). 
97 See Treaty with the Sioux—Brulé, Oglala, Miniconjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa, Black-
feet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs, and Santee—and Arapaho, Apr. 29, 1868, art. 2, 15 
Stat. 635 (describing the land reserved for the Native Americans which is known as the 
Black Hills). 
98 Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee 273–313 (1970) (recounting the 
gradual breakdown of relations between Native Americans and the United States govern-
ment after the discovery of gold on the land). 
99 U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Regulations of the Indian Ofªce 106 (1894); see 
also Cross & Brenneman, supra note 37, at 8. 
100 Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 816; see also San Miguel, supra note 95. 
101 See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 816, 819; Cross & Brenneman, supra note 37, at 41. 
102 Aff. of Romanus Bear Stops in Opp’n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. ¶¶ 16, 20, Bear Lodge, 
175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999) (No. 96-CV-063-D), quoted in Zellmer, supra note 1, at 459 
(second alteration in original). 
103 Nat’l Park Serv., GMP, supra note 95, at 66; see also Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 
6, at 9 (citing Dakota, Lakota, and Nakota Nations Summit V, Resolution No. 93–11, Kyle, 
S.D., June 1993). 
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ceremonies and vision quests.104 This regulation was necessary to pro-
tect tribal rituals from the adverse effects of ever-increasing recrea-
tional and commercial climbing on the rock tower.105 In 1973, 312 
recreational climbers ascended the tower.106 By the mid-1990s, that 
number had grown to 6000 annually.107 The increasing interest in 
climbing has been phenomenal in recent years. Although the ªrst 
technical climb of the tower was achieved in 1937,108 between 1992 
and 1995 the number of climbing routes on the tower increased by 
sixteen percent, and “[d]uring the 1980s, 117 new routes were estab-
lished . . . .”109 These routes cover approximately fourteen percent of 
the rock face.110 Although climbing has grown in accessibility and 
popularity in recent years, climbers still only approximate 1.3% of all 
visitors to the Bear Lodge tower.111
 Recreational climbing impairs Native American use of the site by 
undermining cultural education of tribal children who “see people 
‘playing’ on such an important” site.112 It also disrupts the peaceful-
ness and quietude necessary for spiritual journeys and other ceremo-
nial practices. Finally, climbing bolts and anchors “seriously impair[] 
the spiritual quality of the site.”113 This diminished spiritual quality 
has caused the Native American spirits to leave, making the site a less 
valuable place of worship.114 Climbers have also removed sacred 
prayer bundles, which are important to establish individual relation-
ships between practitioners and spirits.115 To complicate matters, 
however, climbing on Bear Lodge is not merely considered a recrea-
                                                                                                                      
104 Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 6, at 24. NPS itself recognized that “[u]ntil very re-
cently, the importance of American Indian cultural values at Devils Tower has been ne-
glected by the NPS.” Id. 
105 See id. at 22–24. 
106 Id. at 4. 
107 Id. 
108 Nat’l Park Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Devils Tower Climbed, at http://www.nps. 
gov/deto/ªrst_climb.htm (last updated Dec. 22, 2004). 
109 See Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 6, at 4. 
110 Id. at 6. 
111 Id. at 4 (calculating the average between 1989 and 1994). 
112 See Brady, supra note 8, at 166. 
113 Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt 175 F.3d 814, 818 (10th Cir. 1999). 
114 See Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 6, at 8. 
115 See id.; see also Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 818; Burton & Ruppert, supra note 6, at 208; 
Jeffrey R. Hanson & David Moore, Applied Anthropology at Devils Tower National Monument, 
44 Plains Anthropologist 59–60 (1999). 
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tional activity, but is expressly recognized as a historical activity and 
“part of monument culture” dating back one hundred years.116
 NPS created a management plan117 to attempt to balance the 
competing interests in the tower by building consensus among the 
competing users.118 It allows for restrictions on climbing where climb-
ing adversely affects the Native American sacred site or cultural prac-
tices.119 In fact, the management plan was enacted to protect Native 
American cultural uses of Bear Lodge as a place of “historical, architec-
tural or cultural signiªcance at the community, State or regional 
level . . . .”120 One of the site’s primary values is the cultural signiªcance 
of the site to Native American tribes121 and the management plan states 
explicitly that “[r]ecreational climbing at Devils Tower will be managed 
in relation to the tower’s signiªcance as a cultural resource.”122
 The climbing plan was incorporated into the park’s revised gen-
eral management plan.123 The revised general management plan 
notes that “[m]odern recreational use, developments, and climbing 
on the Tower are sometimes in conºict with American Indian tradi-
tional cultural values. High levels of development, visitor use, and 
                                                                                                                      
116 See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 818; Nat’l Park Serv., Management Policies 2001 
§ 8.2.2 (2000) [hereinafter Nat’l Park Serv., Management Policies] (noting that rock 
climbing, while a legitimate recreational activity, may not “be appropriate or allowable in 
all parks; that determination must be made on the basis of park-speciªc planning”), avail-
able at http://www.nps.gov/policy/mp/policies.pdf; Hanson & Moore, supra note 115, at 
54; see also Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 6, at 2 (“National Park Service Management Policies 
recognize rock climbing as a legitimate recreational and historical activity in the park sys-
tem.”). 
117 Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 6, at iii. 
118 See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 37, at 24–25. Recreational climbers agreed to 
the management plan through its representative, The Access Fund. Bonham, supra note 
22, at 180 n.175, 182–83. 
119 See Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 6, at iii. The revised NPS Management Policies 
remove the consumptive use prong and add “unreasonabl[e] interfere[nce] with: The 
atmosphere of peace and tranquility, or the natural soundscape maintained in wilderness 
and natural, historic, or commemorative locations within the park.” Nat’l Park Serv., 
Management Policies, supra note 116, § 8.2. 
120 See WATCH (Waterbury Action to Conserve Our Heritage Inc.) v. Harris, 603 F.2d 
310, 321 (2d Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121 See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819. 
122 Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 6, at i; see also Nat’l Park Serv., GMP, supra note 95, 
at 189. 
123 See Nat’l Park Serv., GMP, supra note 95, at 1 (“The previous General Management 
Plan for Devils Tower was approved in 1986. . . . That plan did not address current issues 
related to greatly increased visitation, the degradation of natural systems, changing re-
gional land uses, and conºicts among various user groups.”). “This General Management 
Plan reafªrms the climbing plan.” Id. at 4. The revised General Management Plan was 
issued after Bear Lodge was decided. 
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crowding at the base of the Tower are not consistent with the spiritual 
nature of the area.”124 The ªnal climbing plan calls for a voluntary 
cessation of recreational climbing during the month of June to be en-
forced by the climbers themselves, during which time the Sun Dance 
and other major Native American cultural ceremonial practices are 
performed.125 It also prohibits the addition of new bolts or ªxed pi-
tons necessary for lead climbing, though it does allow for the re-
placement of such bolts or pitons as authorized by receipt of a per-
mit.126 The management plan also calls for a cross-cultural education 
program about the site, which intends to “lead to a better understand-
ing about climbing and the sacred site issue and the values of Ameri-
can Indians, climbers, and the general public.”127
 The original plan prohibited the issuance of commercial use li-
censes for climbing guides in the month of June,128 but this prohibi-
tion was challenged and eventually rescinded.129 The revised climbing 
management plan instead provides the option to establish a manda-
tory closure if the plan is ultimately determined unsuccessful.130 
While the standards set for “success” appeared to be quite high, re-
quiring perhaps complete voluntary compliance,131 the voluntary clo-
                                                                                                                      
124 Id. at 3. 
125 See Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 6, at 22–24. June is the largest climbing month for 
Bear Lodge, with an average of 1120 climbers each year between 1989 and 1994. Id. at 20. 
August, May, and July were the months with the next highest average of climbers, with 
1095, 1005, and 985, respectively. Id. 
126 See id. at 24–25 (noting also that piton climbing has diminished in popularity). 
127 Id. at 22. 
128 See id. 
 The reasons for the June closure are not tied directly to religious ceremo-
nies at Devils Tower, however, the summer solstice, which occurs in June, is a 
very culturally signiªcant time to American Indians. The 30-day June period 
was selected as a compromise in the modern world. A predictable voluntary 
closure ªxed on a modern calendar month has a better chance to be com-
municated and understood and to be successful than dates based on a shift-
ing lunar calendar. 
Id. at 24. While the language “modern calendar” is supremely offensive, given that mod-
ern-day Native American practitioners rely upon lunar calendars, as does a majority of the 
global populace at least in some respects, the rationale does make sense when attempting 
to compel action from climbers that do not subscribe to a lunar calendar. Therefore, the 
selection of the date, while perhaps seeming more restrictive than necessary to achieve 
compliance, may, in fact, be more likely to succeed than a shifting calendar. 
129 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1450 (D. Wyo. 
1998), aff’d, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999). 
130 Id. 
131 See Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 6, 22–24 (noting that NPS would establish bench-
marks for determining what “success” would mean, but also stating that “[t]he voluntary 
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sure has nevertheless achieved a high level of compliance.132 As a re-
sult, the General Management Plan, revised in 2001, did not modify 
the climbing plan.133 After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bear 
Lodge, NPS decided to leave well enough alone and did not seek to 
amend the management plan.134
C. District Court Analysis 
 The management plan was challenged under the Establishment 
Clause.135 The plaintiffs, a commercial rock climbing association and 
its members, made three major claims, charging that NPS had en-
dorsed or established Native American religion through: (1) the coer-
cive effect of the threat of a mandatory ban on climbing during the 
month of June; (2) an interpretive program that expands the Bear 
Lodge narrative from one of climbing history to both climbing and 
Native American history and cultural importance; and (3) the coer-
cive effect of signs discouraging hikers from wandering off the trail 
out of respect for Native American culture.136 The district court dis-
missed the latter two claims due to lack of standing.137 The court 
                                                                                                                      
closure will be fully successful when every climber personally chooses not to climb at Devils 
Tower during June out of respect for American Indian cultural values. This is the ultimate 
goal of the voluntary June closure.”). The climbing management plan, then, does not 
indicate what level of success would be required to enable the triggering of a mandatory 
closure—which would be one of a multitude of options NPS could take if the voluntary 
closure is deemed unsuccessful. See id. A survey of climbers indicated that 67% of climbers 
would continue climbing the tower knowing that their actions would show disrespect to 
Native American practices. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 818–19 
(10th Cir. 1999). This survey was apparently mischaracterized by the court, as the question 
asked whether climbers would stop climbing altogether throughout the entire year, not 
whether climbers would be willing to forego one month of climbing. See Br. for Intervenors 
in Opp’n. to Pet. for Writ of Cert., Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, No. 99-1045, 
2000 WL 34014041 at *14 n.15 (U.S. 2000). 
132 See Br. for Intervenors in Opp’n. to Pet. for Writ of Cert., Bear Lodge (No. 99-1045), 
2000 WL 34014041 at *6 (noting an 85% decline in recreational climbing in June). 
133 Nat’l Park Serv., GMP, supra note 95, at 27 (noting that “most climbers abide by a 
voluntary climbing ban during June” with “[c]limbing [being] managed according to a 
climbing management plan that was approved in 1995.”). 
134 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000) (denying certio-
rari); Press Release, Nat’l Park Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Supreme Court Refuses to 
Hear Challenge Against Devils Tower National Monument Climbing Management Plan 
(Mar. 27, 2000) (“There will be no changes to the way climbing is managed at Devils Tower 
National Monument. The monument will continue to follow the approved climbing man-
agement plan.”), http://www.nps.gov/deto/pr00_supreme_court.htm. 
135 See Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1451. 
136 See id. 
137 Id. at 1453. 
386 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 32:365 
spent most of its time analyzing whether the voluntary climbing ban 
was a violation of the Establishment Clause.138 It found the climbing 
management plan to be a valid exercise of power and accommodation 
of Native American religious practices,139 but the court reached that 
ªnding through improper analysis and overly restrictive means. 
 The district court applied a First Amendment analysis to the 
climbing ban for no clear reason. Despite the fact that the climbing 
plan did provide an explanation of why the month of June was se-
lected—as a compromise not directly tied to religious practices, but 
rather to the effectiveness of cultural education programs140—the 
court claimed that the climbing plan “does not identify any other rea-
son [other than the cultural signiªcance of the month of June to Na-
tive American tribes] for the June ‘voluntary closure.’”141
 The district court noted that it was not convinced that culture and 
religion were separate for Native American groups,142 but it failed to 
recognize the overwhelming and uncontested consideration of cultural 
rather than religious importance of the site and ceremonial rites noted 
in the climbing plan itself.143 It also failed to conduct an analysis of the 
cultural practices as meeting a deªnition of “religious activity.”144
 On the face of the climbing plan, it is difªcult to claim outright 
that the regulation had a religious purpose. Nevertheless, the court 
stated that it “must look beyond the plain language establishing the 
climbing ban and examine its purpose and effects in order to deter-
mine if it is appropriate accommodation or if it breaches the neces-
sary gap between state and religion fusing the two into one.”145 Where 
the purpose of the regulation is secular, only a rational relationship 
must exist between the regulation and its purposes.146 The district 
court recognized the secular purposes, yet analyzed those purposes as 
if they were religious.147
                                                                                                                      
138 Id. at 1453–57. 
139 See id. at 1456–57. 
140 See discussion supra note 128. 
141 Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d, at 1450. 
142 Id. at 1456 (“The organizations beneªtted . . . are not solely religious organizations, 
but also represent a common heritage and culture.”). 
143 See supra Part II.B. 
144 Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1456 (failing to consider the deªnitional religious activ-
ity as applied to this case). 
145 Id. at 1454. 
146 See supra Part I.C. 
147 See Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1455–56; see also Br. for Intervenors in Opp’n. to Pet. 
for Writ of Cert., Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, No. 99-1045, 2000 WL 
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 The district court recognized that if the case was to operate on a 
constitutional level, it was about the permissible limits of accommoda-
tion—an Establishment Clause claim—rather than determining what 
accommodation is required—a Free Exercise Clause claim.148 How-
ever, the court nevertheless analyzed the claims raised under Free Ex-
ercise, rather than Establishment Clause, jurisprudence.149 In its 
analysis, the court relied upon Badoni v. Higginson—a First Amend-
ment case stating in dicta that “[e]xercise of First Amendment free-
doms may not be asserted to deprive the public of its normal use of an 
area,”150—to require that any accommodation not affect the general 
public’s use of the park.151 The dictum in Badoni stated that if a Free 
Exercise right would restrict all visitor access to a site year-round, pro-
tection of such a right might violate the Establishment Clause.152 The 
dictum, while of little guidance in non-total closures, seems difªcult 
to maintain under emerging First Amendment jurisprudence, since if 
visitor access is restricted, no coercion of beliefs could be effected 
under the coercion test.153 This application of Free Exercise jurispru-
dence implies a belief that the limits of allowed accommodation and 
protection of religion are coterminous.154 This, however, is not the 
case, as discussed earlier in this Article.155 Additionally, the court, con-
strained by precedent in the Tenth Circuit,156 applied both the en-
dorsement test established by Justice O’Connor and the Lemon test,157 
which is considered by some authors to be an “unnecessarily rigorous 
form of scrutiny.”158
                                                                                                                      
34014041, at *26–28 (U.S. 2000) (discussing how the purposes and effects of the regula-
tion are secular). 
148 See Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1455 n.6; supra Part I.B–C. 
149 See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 37, at 27; Grimm, supra note 32, at 20–21. 
150 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980). 
151 Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1455. 
152 Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179. 
153 See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); supra Part I.C. 
154 See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 37, at 30–31 (discussing the interaction between 
the courts’ use of Free Exercise and Establishment Clause tests). 
155 See supra Part I. 
156 See Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 552 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
when uncertainty surrounds the scope of the endorsement test and Establishment Clause 
analysis, they must both be applied in conjunction with the entanglement criterion of the 
Lemon test). 
157 See Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1454; supra Part I.C. 
158 Zellmer, supra note 1, at 514 (addressing the courts’ use of both the Lemon test and 
accommodation tests while also imposing a prohibition on other uses of the public land at 
Bear Lodge). 
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 The district court, while ultimately ªnding in favor of the climbing 
management plan, illustrates the problems with reliance on First 
Amendment jurisprudence generally. Conºation of Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is an easy mistake to make. The 
opinion also illustrates the dangers in relying on the “courts of the 
conqueror.”159 In an oral statement, Judge Downes “questioned 
whether the tribes’ effort and time might not be better spent remedy-
ing Native American social ills like alcoholism.”160 The court apparently 
failed to comprehend the amici claims that loss of cultural identity 
through cultural appropriation and degradation of sacred sites con-
tributes signiªcantly to such preventable and curable social illnesses.161
 The court’s language has been criticized for chilling political ac-
tion to protect Native American interests, narrowing public land 
managers’ discretion to act, and incorrectly interpreting First 
Amendment jurisprudence.162 The district court “implicitly character-
ized the Native Americans’ use of Devils Tower as primarily reli-
gious.”163 It has been argued that the district court’s “interpretation 
fails to impose any practical restriction on the deªnitional reach of 
that key phrase, religious activity. [The court] does not explain [its] 
disregard of the federal government’s uncontroverted ethnographic 
and historical evidence that establishes Native Americans’ long-
standing cultural use, and not necessarily religious use, of Devils 
Tower.”164
 The district court opinion did, however, have some saving graces. 
It recognized that “[t]he organizations beneªtted by the voluntary 
climbing ban, namely Native American tribes, are not solely religious 
organizations, but also represent a common heritage and culture. As a 
result, there is much less danger that the Government’s actions will 
                                                                                                                      
159 See Sager, supra note 31, at 750 (quoting Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 588 
(1823)). 
160 Bonham, supra note 22, at 188 & n.244. 
161 Id. see also Brady, supra note 8, at 166. 
162 Cross & Brenneman, supra note 37, at 10. 
163 Id. at 27. 
 The Defendants attempt to characterize these measures as relating solely 
to American Indian culture and being wholly separate from any religious 
practices. The Court is not persuaded that a legitimate distinction can be 
drawn in this case between the “religious” and “cultural” practices of those 
American Indians who consider Devils Tower a sacred site. 
Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1450 n.2. 
164 Cross & Brenneman, supra note 37, at 40–41. 
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inordinately advance solely religious activities.”165 Nevertheless, the 
court stated that “any subsequent effort to resuscitate this ill-
conceived [climbing] ban would only serve to impair the Defendants’ 
credibility with this Court.”166 It is not clear whether the court re-
ferred to the particular ban, which was potentially objectionable, or to 
any type of ban.167 Although the court improperly viewed the cere-
monial practices at Bear Lodge as religious, it was not blind to the cul-
tural importance of those practices. However, the court did not ac-
knowledge the unique political status of Native American tribes or the 
federal government’s obligations toward tribes. 
D. Circuit Court Analysis 
 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed all claims 
due to a lack of standing, ªnding that the possibility of imposing a 
mandatory climbing ban was hypothetical and not an injury-in-fact.168 
This outcome, while correct under existing precedent, does not deny 
the possibility that a voluntary closure with a less “remote and specu-
lative possibility” of a mandatory closure might coerce compliance, 
causing injury.169 This Article posits the view that any scheme volun-
tary on its face not made mandatory through secondary direct en-
                                                                                                                      
165 Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1456. 
166 Id. at 1452. Climbers and the cultural ceremonies could co-exist, and therefore a 
month-long mandatory closure might create undue hardship on the climbers, especially 
since the ceremonies last only a week or two. Compare Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 
472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985), with Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 6, at i–v. However, it has been 
argued that “[w]here the government’s ownership of the area poses obstacles, both physi-
cal and psychological, to American Indian access and use of an area that had once been 
tribal lands, accommodations are justiªed.” Zellmer, supra note 1, at 515. This Article does 
not go so far as to claim that subjective feelings of psychological interference are sufªcient 
to justify accommodation. Nevertheless, this Article does note that most park enabling 
statutes and land management agencies recognize the importance of quietude to the 
proper enjoyment of the lands. This recognition provides a more objective, if highly dis-
cretionary, foundation upon which to base claims for accommodation. 
167 Denying agencies the ability to ban activities wholly is deemed by most courts to be 
overly restrictive of agency authority. See Br. for Intervenors in Opp’n. to Pet. for Writ of 
Cert., Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, No. 99–1045, 2000 WL 34014041 at *23–
25 (U.S. 2000) (noting that Arlington National Cemetery allows private religious services 
to be closed to the general public, citing 32 C.F.R. § 553.22(c)(3), (f), (g) (2003), in addi-
tion to cases where NPS allows other private religious services and has the authority to 
prohibit incompatible uses). 
168 Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 821–22 (10th Cir. 1999). 
169 See id. at 821; see also Br. for Intervenors in Opp’n. to Pet. for Writ of Cert., Bear 
Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, No. 99–1045, 2000 WL 34014041, at *13 (U.S. 2000) 
(noting that the reasonableness of fear may be important to standing, though calling 
plaintiffs’ fears unreasonable). 
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forcement mechanisms should establish no actual and concrete injury 
sufªcient to provide standing to complainants. The court evaded the 
issue of whether a mandatory closure, if implemented, would consti-
tute sufªcient harm to create standing, and if so, whether or not the 
mandatory closure would be a proper exercise of regulatory author-
ity.170 By evading these questions, the court was able to avoid the First 
Amendment discussion altogether, ªnding other grounds to protect 
Native American cultural interests. 
 Nevertheless, the court made some errors in how it viewed the 
Native American cultural activities at Bear Lodge—the same mistake 
made at the district court level. For instance, the court overly empha-
sized the religious importance of the tower to the Native Ameri-
cans.171 The court referred to creation stories, the Sun Dance, and 
Vision Quests as religious activities.172 Those activities would fail to 
meet standard deªnitions of religious activities,173 yet the court took 
for granted the sincerity of the tribes’ “religious practices.”174
 Despite this mischaracterization of the Native American cultural 
practices at Bear Lodge as religious, the court recognized the impor-
tance of not over-relying on First Amendment jurisprudence.175 The 
court identiªed numerous statutes, executive orders, park enabling 
statutes, and NPS regulations which counsel for the protection of Na-
tive American cultural interests.176 The court stated that “NPS must 
protect the values for which Devils Tower National Monument was 
established. . . . [O]ne of the primary bases for the Tower’s designa-
tion as a National Monument is the prominent role it has played in 
the cultures of several Native American tribes of the North Plains.”177
 Although the court provided agencies some protection when de-
ciding to protect Native American interests,178 the protection is uncer-
tain and highly contextual. It is not clear how far removed the threat 
of a mandatory closure must be for a voluntary closure to pass muster. 
                                                                                                                      
170 See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 821–22. 
171 See id. at 816–17. 
172 Id. 
173 See discussion supra Part I. 
174 Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 816–17. 
175 See id. at 817–18, 819. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 819. 
178 See id. at 817–18. 
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Conclusion 
 Culture is not merely comprised of religion. Culture is the “mate-
rial, spiritual, and artistic expression of a group that deªnes itself . . . 
as a [distinct] culture, both according to daily lived experience and 
according to practice and theory.”179 Culture is important to the 
group not merely as a means for the group to express itself, though 
this is also of great importance as it includes “language, literary and 
artistic traditions, music, customs, dress, festivals, ceremonies” and 
other modes of expression,180 but also has its own intrinsic value.181
 Courts and scholars tend to analyze culture as coextensive with 
religion, and vice versa, relying upon Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence in the protection of Native American cultural 
interests.182 However, this is troublesome when courts and scholars 
simply assume that cultural activities constitute religious activities, 
without analyzing whether the activity meets the deªnition of a reli-
gious activity.183 “Native Americans typically view religion more in 
terms of culture than in terms of what most Americans consider relig-
ion. Notably, no traditional Native American language has one word 
that could translate to ‘religion.’”184
 The failure of courts and scholars to distinguish between culture 
and religion is not harmless. It results in two very important out-
comes. First, it redeªnes cultural activity as religious, negating tribes’ 
ability to deªne their own practices. This re-deªnition of cultural 
practices by external sources constitutes cultural appropriation and 
harms tribes’ ability to sustain the vitality of their cultures.185 For in-
stance, where ceremonial practices are recast solely in terms of reli-
gious practices, and religious practices are seen as individualistic in 
nature, the importance of the ceremonial practice to the community 
                                                                                                                      
179 Jonathan Hart, Translating and Resisting Empire: Cultural Appropriation and Postcolonial 
Studies, in Borrowed Power: Essays on Cultural Appropriation 137, 138 (Bruce Ziff & 
Pratima V. Rao eds., 1997). 
180 Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right to Culture, 61 Soc. Res. 
491, 498 (1994). 
181 Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion 70 (1993). 
182 See generally Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 816–17 (discussing Sun Dances and Vision 
Quests as religious practices). 
183 See id. 
184 Winslow, supra note 29, at 1295. 
185 See Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and 
Cultural Rights, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 299, 307, 310 (2002); Hart, supra note 179, at 137–38; Vo-
gel, supra note 6, at 776–77. 
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is diminished. Since government has an explicit mandate to support 
Native American culture, this is intolerable. 
 A second and more direct outcome also results from characteriz-
ing cultural activities as religious activities: the invocation of First 
Amendment jurisprudence. The Establishment Clause prescribes the 
upper limits to which the federal government may accommodate reli-
gious activities. However, no such limit exists for cultural activities, 
except as required by the Equal Protection Clause, which is largely 
surmountable in the unique case of Native American tribes.186 As a 
result, characterizing Native American cultural activities as religious 
may limit the protections available to them. 
 A more pragmatic concern with characterizing Native American 
cultural activities as religious is that the First Amendment has not his-
torically been a friend to Native American interests. Native American 
Free Exercise claims have universally been denied. While RFRA may 
improve Native Americans’ chances of achieving victory in court, 
RFRA’s impact is uncertain and limited to religious activities.187 
Therefore, Native American activists choosing to protect cultural in-
terests under RFRA may see some level of cultural appropriation and 
may still be pursuing a second- or third-best resolution.188 Addition-
ally, the new Establishment Clause standards mean that “proponents 
of Native American sacred sites and religious freedom on public lands 
can never entirely predict with accuracy the type of test a particular 
court will employ.”189
 While courts often have mistakenly applied religious masks to 
cultural activities, some cultural activities are religious in nature.190 In 
those cases, however, the courts also mistakenly ªnd those religious 
activities not to be religious for First Amendment purposes.191 Despite 
meeting the deªnition of religious activities, these activities have not 
been recognized as religious because courts have failed to understand 
the site-speciªc nature of some Native American religions.192 This site-
                                                                                                                      
186 See Erik B. Bluemel, Accommodating Native American Cultural Activities on Federal Public 
Lands, 41 Idaho L. Rev. (forthcoming 2005). 
187 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000). 
188 Cf. Hooker, supra note 21, at 137 (“American Indians have had to rely on the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to support their claims.”). 
189 Bonham, supra note 22, at 166–67. 
190 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 816–17 (10th Cir. 1999). 
191 See, e.g., Inupiat Cmty. v. United States, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984); Sequoyah v. 
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speciªcity precludes Native Americans from practicing their religious 
beliefs on non-sacred lands—a stark contrast to the Judeo-Christian 
religious beliefs upon which the Free Exercise Clause was founded.193 
Destruction of sacred sites should be properly analogized to Judeo-
Christian holy lands because worship and prayer occur there and de-
struction of those holy lands, while not literally destroying the oppor-
tunity for religious worship, does impose time, place, and manner re-
strictions on religious practices such that the practices become less 
meaningful.194
 In Free Exercise cases, courts often have noted that Native 
American religious beliefs would be substantially burdened or even 
“devastated” by federal undertakings on public lands, but ªnding in 
every case that a “compelling” government interest outweighed reli-
gious protection.195 This illustrates the dilemma faced by Native 
Americans seeking to protect their cultural practices—despite the al-
lure of constitutional protections, it often is best to seek cultural, 
rather than religious, protection of Native American sacred sites and 
cultural activities. 
 Bear Lodge is just a microcosm of the conºicts over uses that 
might arise on public lands. It does, however, represent the largest 
growing conºict of management of public lands—the conºict be-
tween Native American cultural uses and increasing recreational uses. 
Bear Lodge “will most likely not be the last time a federal court will 
evaluate a conºict between resource user groups on public lands and 
balance the interests of Native American religious activities against 
recreation interests and federal land management agency deci-
sions.”196
 In fact, the management plan of Rainbow Bridge National 
Monument was challenged based on strikingly similar claims.197 The 
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Rainbow Bridge, a nearly 300-foot-high arch—the largest natural, 
freestanding sandstone arch in the world—is sacred to the White 
Mesa Ute, San Juan Southern Paiute, Kaibab Paiute, Hopi, and Navajo 
tribes.198 While the policy at Rainbow Bridge was discouragement,199 
after the Bear Lodge suit park managers changed the park signs dis-
couraging individuals from walking under the Bridge to more clearly 
indicate that the request is purely voluntary so as to avoid Establish-
ment Clause challenges.200
 The Rainbow Bridge example illustrates that, although Bear Lodge 
had its failings, it nevertheless provided strength and security to fed-
eral land managers in regulating recreational behavior. The question 
remains whether voluntary efforts to protect Native American cultural 
practices will be sufªciently successful. More important, however, is 
that Bear Lodge does not address the large range of private and public 
interests which might conºict with Native American cultural uses and 
does not avoid the pitfalls of applying First Amendment jurispru-
dence to what are, essentially, cultural claims. 
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